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Banks’ Risk Assessment Of Swedish SMEs 
ABSTRACT  
Building on the literatures on asymmetric information and risk-taking, this paper 
applies conjoint experiments to investigate lending officers’ probabilities of supporting credit 
to established or existing SMEs. Using a sample of 114 Swedish lending officers, we test 
hypotheses concerning how information on the borrowers ability to repay the loan; alignment 
of risk preferences; and risk sharing affect their willingness to grant credit. Results suggest 
that features that reduce the risk to the bank and shift the risk to the borrower have the largest 
impact. The paper highlights the interaction between factors that influence the credit decision. 
Implications for SMEs, banks and research are discussed. 
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BANKS’ RISK ASSESSMENT OF SWEDISH SMES  
 
INTRODUCTION - IMPORTANCE OF BANK LENDING FOR SWEDISH SMES 
Like other Western countries, borrowings from banks are by far the most common source of 
external financing for small business in Sweden (Winborg and Landström 2001; Berggren 
2002). Berger and Udell (2003) report that debt represents 50 % of the capital structure of 
small firms in the US. 52% of firms less than two year old, have debt as their major source of 
funding with commercial bank loans the most common source of external financing. Whilst 
venture capital firms have been extensively researched, small firms’ relationships with banks 
have been comparatively neglected (Riding, Haines and Thomas, 1994). When small business 
managers seek bank loans it is important that they understand the logic of the lending officers 
decision process in order to increase the chance of receiving credit and to understand which 
factors increase their chances to receive a better credit rating. A better credit rating enables 
the firm to finance their capital requirements and to decrease the cost of credit. In addition, a 
better credit rating might also effect the ability to generate external equity. Previous research 
has found bank loans to be the most important external source for financing small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) capital requirements (Barton and Matthew 1989; Meyer 
1993; Winborg and Landström, 2001), but that SMEs generally have difficulties obtaining 
such loans (Walker, 1989; Binks, Ennew and Reed, 1992). Sweden is considered to have a 
bank orientated relationship based financial system in which banks play an important role in 
the financing of firms (Sjögren and Zackrisson, 2005). Swedish banks lending has increased 
during the past several years and amounted to 2,044 billion SEK at the end of 2006, 41% of 
this lending is to the Swedish business sector which includes large firms and SMEs 
(Bankföreningen, 2007). Swedish banks seldom separate business credits by the business size 
of the creditors. In banking terms, small business credits most often refers to the size of the 
loan instead of to the size of the borrower. The economic significance of SMEs is reflected 
explicitly. For example, in the annual statement of one large Swedish bank, more than 98% of 
the corporate clients of this bank are SMEs (FöreningsSparbanken, 2006). SMEs account for 
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85% of the total lending of the bank to the business sector. These arguments indicate the 
importance of bank loans to SMEs from the perspective of both the bank and the firm.  
There are a number of reasons why a growing SME finances its capital requirements with 
debt. First, in the financial literature it is argued that firms apply a “pecking order” when 
financing their capital needs, i.e. they first use the cheapest funds and then, as cheaper 
financing alternatives come to an end, progressively make use of more and more expensive 
funds (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Therefore many firms, it is argued prefer internally generated 
and “nearly internal” funds in the form of equity financing from SME sources, such as 
owners, friends and family, business associates, and other personal contacts. In this way, 
SMEs can finance capital requirements with relatively low issuing and information costs 
(Berger & Udell, 2003).  
However, these funds are often not sufficient enough to finance innovation or growth, and 
the firm has to turn to external financing alternatives. External financing can be differentiated 
into two types - equity and debt. External equity financing alternatives are limited for SMEs 
compared with larger firms, because most SMEs are privately held and cannot issue shares on 
the public market. Other external equity alternatives for financing a growth project could be 
sources from venture capitalists or those known as business angels. Most firms are not 
expected to rely on venture capital due to constraints on both demand and supply (Cressy & 
Olofsson, 1997). Cressy (1993) found that less than 1% of start-ups in the UK were financed 
with venture capital.  
The situation is similar in Sweden. Although the Swedish risk capital market seems well 
developed when compared to other European countries, Sweden is still lagging behind the 
United States. Sweden occupies third place, with more than 1% in the European Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) list of investments in relation to the Gross 
Domestic Product of each member country for 2005. Sweden’s is Europe’s third largest 
private equity market in absolute terms with a 6.4 percent share of the overall European 
private equity market in 2005 and behind the UK (51%) and France (16%). 
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Swedish private equity players invested more than 27 billion SEK (approx. € 3 billion) in 
2005, an increase of 85% compared to the level in 2004. (EVCA Yearbook 2006). A 
comparison of this with the lending of Swedish banks to the Swedish commercial and 
industrial sector, with lendings of 743 billion SEK in 2005 (Bankföreningen, 2006) and 829 
billion SEK for 2006 (Bankföreningen, 2007), indicates that risk and venture capital finances 
a fraction of Swedish businesses.  
Second, typically most SME growth projects are relatively small in scale and do not meet 
the screening criteria of venture capitalists. Furthermore, the search process for venture 
capital or other external equity sources, such as business angels’ financing, is often connected 
to considerable costs and other disadvantages.  
Third, bootstrapping theory suggests that firms prefer to finance their capital requirements 
with external debt over external equity if sources of internal and nearly internal funds are 
exhausted (Barton & Matthew, 1989; Myers, 1984; Winborg & Landström, 2001). Loans 
from banks represent an important funding source for entrepreneurs in business development. 
Most SMEs are  concerned with obtaining debt funding from banks because this is a more 
attractive, realistic and obtainable source than external equity. Bank finance compared to 
equity does not affect the ownership and management of the small firm. For example Cressy 
and Olofsson (1997) found that Swedish directors’ attitudes towards new owners often 
exemplify an extreme degree of control aversion and that this aspect is particularly important 
for smaller firms. The cost for verification is lower for external debt than for external equity 
which requires a higher rate of return compared to debt.  
BANK LENDING DECISION MAKING  
Problems associated with SMEs receiving external finance may be attributed to the fact that 
the vast majority are privately held and owner managed rather than their size per se. First, as 
compared to publicly traded firms, privately held firms lack access to important financial 
instruments such as issuing new public stock. Second, owner managed firms are less 
transparent. Therefore, these firms have an information advantage vis-à-vis external financers. 
This information asymmetry can be used opportunistically by the borrower, which can 
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restrain the willingness of external financers to invest in the business (Fiet, 1995). Because of 
this information asymmetry it is critical for banks to properly evaluate the credit risk of a 
borrower. The expected profitability of credit engagements is the primary criterion for this 
decision. The accuracy of credit decisions has significant impact on the overall profitability of 
a bank (Ruth, 1987; Ammann 2001).  
The lending officer does not know ex-ante how likely an SME is to repay a loan and 
interest. Asymmetric information can lead to the well-known adverse selection problem 
(Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) which in turn, could manifest itself in opportunistic behaviour and 
moral hazard. Furthermore, although the owner-manager may reveal all the formal 
information that he or she has access to, this information may be incomplete or erroneous. 
Consequently, the credit process represents a critical bank function. It has to ensure 
that credit is granted to customers who are capable and willing to repay the loan and interest, 
and denied to those who are not. As a result, it is essential that banks develop methods that 
reduce risk and uncertainty in managing loans to SMEs. Because individual lending officers 
make decisions on granting credit to SMEs, such methods translate directly into decision-
making processes of the lending officers. Therefore, improved understanding of lending 
officers’ decision-making can provide better understanding of the efficacy of banks’ credit 
processes. Such knowledge, in turn, is valuable for banks as well as for SMEs applying for 
loans. 
Investments in new projects have two possible outcomes: if a project is successful, it 
generates a profit; if it is unsuccessful, then the investment is lost. A project funded by a loan 
limits the borrower’s potential loss but not the potential profit. If the project is successful, the 
borrower yields the profit (less interest) after repaying the loan. If the project is unsuccessful, 
the borrower potentially does not loose anything. For the lender, the situation is the opposite. 
The lender yields a limited gain (interest) if the borrower’s project is successful. If the project 
is unsuccessful, the lender loses the amount lent. Therefore, borrowers and lenders have 
different risk preferences. This leads to the well-known adverse selection problem (Stiglitz 
and Weiss, 1981). Investors have strong incentive to use their own money for the projects 
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where returns are certain and attempt to borrow money for riskier projects. Hence, adverse 
selection may lead SMEs to only ask for external funding for their riskiest projects, but it is 
difficult for potential lenders and investors to find out if this is the case because of 
information asymmetry (Cressy and Toivanen, 2001). 
In order to deal with this potential problem, banks and other lenders have developed 
measures to safeguard against losses. First, they gather information that can inform them on 
the chances of the borrower failing to repay the loan. Such information is typically associated 
with the characteristics of the borrower (Sargent and Young, 1991; Sinkey, 1992; Scherr, 
Sugrue & Ward, 1993). However, in the UK for example there has been a move away from 
“character lending” (Bank of England, 1994). Banks are increasingly taking the view that 
lending decisions should be based on the cash flow, business plan and prospects, thus 
adopting an income based approach (Fletcher, 1995). But where asymmetries of information 
exist banks can adopt a capital based approach with an emphasis on gearing and financial 
assets (security) on risk assessment (Berry, Faulkner & Jarvis, 2001; Binks & Ennew, 1996). 
Second, in order to align the risk bearing function of lender and borrower, they can 
demand the borrower to make part of the investment (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shapiro 1990). 
Third, in order to shift the risk from the bank to the borrower, they can ask for collateral 
(Bergström and Lennander, 1997; Anderson, 1999), or ensure that the financial standing of 
the borrower is solid enough to repay the loan should the project fail (Altman, 1983; Sinkey, 
1992; Beaulieu, 1994 & 1996).  
Despite banks efforts to homogenise the loan decision making process across loan 
officers, research suggests that the decisions made by loan officers actually vary according to 
the loan officers’ level of experience (Andersson, 2001). Fletcher (1995, p37) argues 
“Although there is delegated decision making, bank managers make their lending decisions 
against a background of rules and head office instructions. There are many variables which 
influence the rules and the work environment, and affect the lending decision (for example, 
training, internal guidelines, upward referral system and discretionary limits, specific head 
office directives). The lending decision is a process of interaction between the rules and a 
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manager’s experience …”, which explains the variation in decision outcome even with formal 
guidelines for the credit decision. Some banks in the UK have recently adopted credit scoring 
to support decision making, allowing managers to focus on developing relations with 
customers (Deakins, Ram, Smalbone and Fletcher, 2004). 
Loan officers are attempting to determine the likelihood of the borrower repaying the 
loan. Based on explicit decision policies set forth by the bank, loan officers would likely sum 
up the different signals / factors received by the borrower to rate the risk for any given 
customer. In Sweden, although lending officers are supported by the formal decision system 
of the bank, the individual lending officer is an essential factor in the credit decision process. 
The business credit, compared to the customer credit, is still a manual and individual process 
in Swedish banks (Bruns, 2001). It is the individual bank manager’s obligation to document 
his analysis which combined with the formal decision system will build the basis for the 
banks decision. The final decision is often made on a higher hierarchical level, depending on 
the amount and riskiness, from the local bank office committee to the banks headquarters. 
This is in contrast to recent developments in the UK, where banks have used credit scoring 
systems and centralized decision making to help overcome difficulties in assessing risk in 
small firm loan applicants (Deakins et al., 2004)  
Concerning the characteristics of the firm affecting the likelihood of receiving 
funding, an extensive literature review shows that information pertaining to the characteristics 
of the borrower typically deals with the general risk proclivity of the SME (Sargent et al., 
1991; Scherr et al., 1993; Sinkey, 1992), the competence within the business project 
(Berggren, Lindström & Olofsson, 2001; Harhof & Körting, 1998; Hedeling & Sjöberg, 1993 
& 1995;Petersen & Rajan, 1994); the CEO’s personal experience (Beaulieu, 1994 & 1996; 
Cooper et al., 1989 & 1995; Davidson & Honig, 2003; Hedelin, 1999; Jankowicz & Hisrich, 
1987; Keasey & Watson, 1991; Pettit & Singer, 1985); the extent of strategic planning 
(Beaulieu, 1994 & 1996; Sinkey, 1992; Berger, 1997/1998; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; 
Matthews & Scott, 1995); and the past performance of the firm (Gibson 1993; Kam 1990; 
Altman 1983); Beaulieu, 1996; Berger & Udell, 1995; Deakins & Hussain, 1994; Tiermey & 
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Truglio, 1997; Uzzi, 1999). For a review of previous research that discusses the use of these 
factors, the reader is referred to Table 1 in the appendix. In the following section, we develop 
hypotheses of how these information factors affect the willingness of lending officers to grant 
credits. We also hypothesize how factors that affect the risk bearing of the parties affect the 
probability of granting credit. More specifically, we hypothesize how the SME’s share of the 
investment; current financial standing; and the SME’s collateral affect the willingness to grant 
credits independently as well as in interaction with the general risk proclivity of the SME.  
AIM OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Previous research is contradictory concerning the importance that lending officers place on 
different factors to make their credit assessment. In the social judgment theory, it is suggested 
that espoused decision processes have limitations reflective of the actual decision processes 
(Priem, 1992; Priem & Harrison, 1994; Zacharakis, 1995). It was found that espoused 
processes typically employ a larger number of criteria than is actually used in the decision 
process. Studies in the field of strategic management (Stahl & Zimmerer, 1984), consumer 
behaviour (Ettenson, 1993), and venture capital (Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Shepherd, 
1997; Zacharakis, 1995; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998) found that decision makers do not 
correctly recall their decision-making. 
Therefore, it is vital to investigate how lending officers combine different factors in 
their credit assessment and to examine which factors are most important to a lending officer 
without being the subject of post hoc rationalization and recall biases. For that reason, it is 
relevant to look more closely at the factors actually considered during the credit assessment. 
We extend previous research by implementing a conjoint experiment to observe the utilization 
of decision criteria in real-time decisions by loan officers. The aim of the research is to 
explore the factors that influence lending officers’ decisions concerning credit support to 
existing SMEs. To approach this issue, we rely on conjoint experiments. Conjoint analysis has 
been successfully employed in a variety of disciplines since the early 1960s (Gustafsson, 
Herrmann & Huber, 2001) and successfully used in entrepreneurial settings, e.g. Zacharakis, 
1995; Muzyka, D., Birley, S. and Leleux, B. 1996; Shepherd, 1997. In addition, we examine a 
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broad array of factors previously identified in the literature and assess both direct and 
interaction effects. This allows us to tease out the range and complexity of factors influencing 
their decisions. 
The SME’s Risk Proclivity  
Moral hazard can be described as a situation where the SME deliberately takes advantage of 
information asymmetry to redistribute wealth to itself in a covert manner, which is ultimately 
detrimental to the bank (Binks et al., 1992). The problem of moral hazard is particularly 
relevant when relatively large amounts of external debt are needed in relation to internally 
generated funds or additional funds from the owner. The investment in high-growth projects 
can have a significant impact on the strategy of SMEs (Berger and Udell, 2003), which might 
imply shifting risk to the debt holder after the credit contract is executed (Bruns, 2004). There 
are several ways borrowers can benefit at the expense of the lender. One alternative for the 
SME is to follow the preferences of the owner-managers i.e., the risk-taking level of the bank 
increases. The owner-manager may be more interested in protecting his or her own equity 
than repaying a loan, thus may withhold information that could alter this outcome. This 
behaviour can also manifest itself in a firm that uses the amount lent for other purposes than 
agreed upon. An SME owner-manager may use the credit for other projects or for private 
consumption instead of financing the agreed upon investment or project. Furthermore, the 
entrepreneurs also have an incentive to be opportunistic in their use of resources (financial 
bootstrapping). This puts demands on the bank to ensure that its borrowers do not engage in 
moral hazard (Bruns, Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005).Therefore, a fundamental challenge is 
associated with the tendency of banks to be risk averse in assuring loan repayment and 
growing SMEs taking risks in search of high returns.  
Lending officers attempt to predict the behaviour and operational risk of the SME. 
This means that both the risk of the investment and its impact on the overall risk of the firm 
are evaluated. Risk estimation is difficult, especially if the company is privately held because 
it can lead to substantial information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Pettit and 
Singer 1985; Barton and Matthew 1989; Ang 1991; Binks, et al., 1992). Despite the potential 
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problems of obtaining the relevant information of the risk proclivity of the borrowing SME, 
research suggests that it is one of the most important factors influencing the willingness of 
banks to supply credits. Building on the insights of the risk proclivity of growing SMEs and 
previous empirical findings concerning the importance banks put on estimating the risk 
proclivity of their customers, we pose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit decreases with increased risk 
proclivity of the borrowing SME.  
Competence within the Business Project 
The quality of the human capital of the people working in the SME is a critical factor 
influencing the likelihood that the business is able to expand successfully (Dess and Picke 
1999). However, the quality of human capital cannot be easily observed or measured by 
external parties, such as banks (Pettit and Singer 1985; Keasey and McGuiness 1990; Scherr, 
et al., 1993). One way to assess the quality of the human capital is to examine the SMEs 
success with projects that require similar competence, knowledge and skills (Brüderl and 
Schüssler, 1990). An SME that has successfully completed a similar project or a project that 
requires comparable competence, know-how and skills more likely has the capability to 
execute the new project. A positive track record impacts a credit decision when similar 
projects have been successful (Sargent and Young, 1991; Scherr et al., 1993). For the lending 
officer, it is therefore advantageous to learn whether a similar project has been completed 
successfully in the past. This track record is used to evaluate the probability of success for the 
new project which in turn influences the likelihood of fulfilling the credit agreement. Thus: 
Hypothesis 2: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit increases with 
increased level of competence within the business project of the borrowing SME. 
CEO Tenure 
Another important aspect of the human capital of the SME is directly tied to the qualities of 
the CEO. Human capital theory posits that individuals with more or higher quality human 
capital achieve higher performance in executing relevant tasks (Becker, 1975). Human capital 
provides small business managers with knowledge that assists them in identifying 
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opportunities and knowledge of ways to more effectively and efficiently pursue growth. In the 
entrepreneurship literature a frequently investigated aspect of human capital is previous 
experience. This experience may lead to expertise in running an independent business 
(Wright, Robbie and Ennew, 1997) and provide benchmarks for judging the relevance of 
information (Cooper, Folta and Woo, 1995) which can enhance performance (Davidsson and 
Honig, 2003). Therefore, the development and performance of SMEs tend to be correlated to 
the small business manager’s individual human capital (Brüderl and Schüssler, 1990). The 
experience and track record of the CEO are therefore regarded as strong indicators of the 
company’s future performance (George, 1991) and its ability to succeed with a new business 
project.  
Longer tenure as a small business manager demonstrates more experience and 
therefore more human capital. Further, managers with longer experience tend to be older 
therefore they might be more risk averse since their investment time horizon is shorter (Scherr 
et al., 1993). Empirical evidence supports that CEO tenure is associated with lower risk-
taking (Wiklund, 1998). Taken together this suggests that longer tenure is associated with 
higher chances of succeeding in new business projects and a tendency to involve in projects 
that have low as opposed to high risk. This should lead lending officers to be more likely to 
support credit to CEOs with longer tenure. Thus: 
Hypothesis 3: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit increases with increased 
tenure of the CEO of the borrowing SME. 
Strategic Planning  
In evaluating the creditworthiness of a customer, the lending officer has to evaluate the firm’s 
ability to respond to changing conditions and develop and implement effective strategies 
(Berger, 1997/1998). For this purpose, the customer’s business plan, as part of the strategic 
planning, can be used in two-ways. First, it is an indicator of the ability of management to 
communicate the strategy of the firm to external parties. The firm’s strategy should be clear 
and consistent in order to persuade external parties, such as banks, who make commitments to 
the firm’s future success (Sargent and Young, 1991). An SME that articulates its intentions in 
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a formal plan will minimize confusion and enable the lending officer to better understand the 
business.  
Second, a comprehensive strategic plan signals strategic competence. The extent and 
cohesiveness of information, and an understanding of the factors that affect financial 
performance and product quality are indirect indicators for the quality of management (Sinkey 
1992) and are therefore indicators of the ability of the firm to perform well. Taken together, 
this suggests that SMEs that are better able to produce comprehensive business plans are in a 
better position to receive a bank loan. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit increases with the 
comprehensiveness of the borrowing SME’s business plan. 
Past Performance 
The past financial performance of a firm is an important factor to estimate its ability to repay 
a loan (Gibson, 1993). Past profitability shows the firms past operational success and thus 
provides tangible representations of the competence of the SME. Indicators for a company’s 
past performance are found in quantitative measures based on accounting information. A 
firm’s generated profit or loss is provided through external accounting information. The main 
purpose of external accounting information is to provide useful data to potential investors, 
creditors and other users to make rational financial decisions (Kam, 1990). These measures 
are ratios based on the firm’s financial statement, i.e. balance sheets and income and cash 
flow statements. Financial ratios have been reported as reliable predictors of corporate failure 
by some researchers (e.g. Altman, 1983), which indicate their importance in the prediction of 
default on credit. Therefore information on past financial performance, such as financial 
ratios, allows banks to assess the creditworthiness of a particular firm. While it is possible that 
new projects are unrelated to previous projects, or that the human capital of the SME has 
changed, the lending officer could still, with some accuracy, make an estimation of the 
probability of the success of a new project on the basis of such historical statements.  
Further, because financial statements have to be audited by audited accountants, the 
figures presented are likely to be accurate and reliable. If the financial performance of the 
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borrowing SME has been poor in the past, this would indicate shortcomings in management 
or other areas, and the incentives for developing new projects might be dubious. If, on the 
other hand, the firm has been successful in the past, this would indicate that it has the 
competence to develop new projects. Thus: 
Hypothesis 5: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit increases with higher 
past financial performance of the borrowing SME. 
SMEs’ Share of Investment 
Due to the combined role of management and ownership the owner-manager has both 
financial and human capital at risk in the firm. Financing a new project, the owner-manager is 
often required to substantiate cash investment, which secure that she or he will act in the 
investor’s best interest.  
An external equity holder has much better control than a bank, through ownership 
over the managerial and strategic actions of the firm and can directly influence the strategy of 
the firm. Consequently, the problem of moral hazard is of limited concern if the project is 
financed with equity instead of external debt. This might explain why many high-growth 
firms and high-risk ventures often obtain external equity from venture capitalist or business 
angels before they obtain external debt (Berger & Udell, 2003).  
It can be argued that the firm’s willingness to finance a larger part of the project by equity 
would be seen as a positive signal by the bank lending officer. First, a larger share of the 
investment being financed by the owner or through internally generated funds can be 
interpreted as a sign that the owner manager strongly believes in the success of the project and 
is willing to risk either personal funds or internally generated funds. Thus, it serves to align 
the interests of the lender and borrower, decreasing chances of opportunistic behaviour 
(Bruns, 2004). Second, financing a larger share through internally generated funds, or by 
additional owner investment, decreases the amount of external funding required, which 
decreases the credit risk of the bank due to a lower amount of external financing. 
Consequently, the lending officers evaluation of success with the business project and the 
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evaluation of supporting a credit request is influenced by the firm’s/owner’s share of 
investment. Thus:  
Hypothesis 6: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit increases with an 
increased share of the investment done by the borrowing SME.  
Financial Position 
The current financial position of a firm is dependent, in part, on its past performance because 
profits and losses in the past increase or decrease the financial strength of the firm. However, 
the financial position of the borrower influences the credit decision somewhat differently than 
past performance does. Current financial position is mainly an indicator of whether or not the 
borrower is solid enough to repay the loan should the individual project that money is sought 
for fail. Therefore, the effect of financial standing on the credit decision is similar to that of 
collateral – a strong financial position indicates that the borrower is able to repay the loan 
irrespectively of the outcome of the individual project. Thus: 
Hypothesis 7: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit increases with 
stronger financial standing of the borrowing SME.  
Collateral 
One way for the bank to protect itself against a credit default is to limit the freedom of action 
of the owner-manager (Hand, Loyd and Rogow, 1982) which reduces the probability of 
opportunistic behaviour. This can be done through requiring collateral. Collateral represents 
an alternative source of repayment for the bank and is liquidated if the borrower defaults. 
Besides collateral from the firm, the lender often requires non-corporate assets such as 
personal guarantees or collateral from the owner-manager. Personal guarantees or collateral is 
equivalent to the owner-manager investing their own equity in the firm because they are 
putting their personal funds at risk (Thorne, 1989), exposing the borrower to personal losses 
in case of failure. Further, securities, such as personal guarantees and collateral, ensure that 
the borrower is committed to the company and motivated to resolve serious problems (Berger, 
1997/1998) because personal assets are at risk. Thus the risk for opportunistic behaviour is 
limited (Toivanen and Cressy, 2000). 
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Collateral that is independent of the project’s or firm’s success, such as bonds and 
shares in other firms, guarantee commitments, or private property, is of particular value to the 
bank. The value of other types of collateral, such as floating charge, or receivables, may 
change depending on the success of the project or the performance of the firm. Therefore, 
because of the uncertainty of the value, such collateral represents greater risk for the bank, 
and is typically less valued (Leeth, 1989). This should lead banks to be less restrictive in 
lending money to SMEs that provide collateral that is independent of the borrowing SME’s 
future success. Thus: 
Hypothesis 8: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit increases with 
increases in the strength of the collateral supplied by the borrowing SME. 
Interaction Hypotheses 
Banks wish to make investments in projects where the chance of the borrower defaulting is 
low, i.e. they prefer to invest in low risk projects. However, if the bank can ensure to retrieve 
its loan regardless of the outcome of the project, risk-taking becomes less of a concern. 
Therefore, we would expect an interaction effect between the risk-taking proclivity of the 
borrowing SME and factors pertaining to the chances of the bank retrieving its loan regardless 
of the outcome of the project. 
It may be important to consider the SME’s share of financing the investment 
concurrently as the risk proclivity. A larger share supplied by the borrowing firm shifts the 
risk bearing from the lender to the borrower and serves to assure that the borrower acts in the 
best interest of the lender. Also, for a given project, the amount the bank needs to supply 
decreases with an increase is the share of the investment supplied by the borrowing SME. 
Therefore, a higher portion of the SME’s share to finance the capital requirement can 
compensate, in part, for a higher risk proclivity. Thus:  
Hypothesis 9: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit decreases with high-
risk proclivity, but at a faster rate for firms supplying a small share of the financing. 
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An SME’s financial position is likely evaluated in combination with its risk 
proclivity. A strong financial position can compensate, in part, for a higher risk proclivity, 
because the bank is likely to retrieve the loan regardless of the outcome of the project. For an 
SME with a weak financial position, on the other hand, chances of receiving a loan should 
decrease rapidly with increases in risk proclivity, because they will not be able to repay the 
loan should the project fail. This leads to the following interaction hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 10: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit decreases with high-
risk proclivity, but at a faster rate for firms with a weak financial position  
 
The probability of a bank asking for collateral increases with the estimated risk of a 
project because the probability of credit default increases. Deakins and Philpott (1993) have 
argued that security can be used as a surrogate for more important information concerning the 
risk of a proposition in the decision-making process. This implies that firms investing in 
riskier projects would face greater demands for collateral. However, the bank will probably 
reject a loan if the risk is regarded as too high because banks avoid placing themselves in a 
position where they are likely to have to call on the security to repay the loan (Coult, 1992). 
Collateral or securities do not increase the borrower's ability to repay the credit and interest. 
Instead, collateral is a last resort of repayment for the bank in case the borrower is not able or 
willing to fulfil the credit obligations. Consequently, collateral is a form of insurance for the 
bank to assure that the amount lent can be recovered in case of default. This taken into 
account, we still would expect collateral to be used to offset the risk-taking of the bank. Thus: 
Hypothesis 11: Lending officers’ probability of supporting credit decreases with high-
risk proclivity, but at a faster rate for firms supplying weak collateral. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Experimental Design 
Berry et al. (1993) have highlight the variety of lending propositions that the banker will 
encounter for example, established/new business, existing/new customer, size of business. 
This current study was carried out to investigate how Swedish lending officers make credit 
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decisions to existing SMEs and the importance of criteria used to form the decision. Indeed 
researchers have recently turned their attention to the problem of moderate “non-stellar” 
growth firms with growth potential, that may be unable to attract funding needed to ensure 
prosperity (Oakey, 2007). In order to understand the importance of different factors in lending 
officers’ credit assessment, it was felt insufficient to rely on official bank policy. In order to 
test the hypotheses, as discussed above, we used conjoint experiments. This allowed us to 
focus on concurrent rather than retrospective reporting, which limits problems of recall and 
social desirability biases common in survey research on decision-making (Shepherd and 
Zacharakis 1997, 1999). The benefit of using a conjoint analysis for this study is the ability to 
decompose each lending officer’s credit assessment in its underlying structure. This allows us 
to focus on concurrent, real time rather than retrospective reporting, which limits problems of 
recall and social desirability biases common in survey research on decision-making (Shepherd 
and Zacharakis 1997 & 1999). 
The lending officers evaluated the likelihood of them granting credit to a series of 
hypothetical existing SMEs. The firms have an established relationship with the bank but it is 
a new contact for the lending officer.  
As a baseline, all firms were characterized as selling five products or services; having 
a market share of 5% in a local market; competition being neither intense nor weak; situated 
in a city of 120.000 inhabitants; the five biggest customers generate 40 % of sales; and cash 
flow matches industries average. Finally, the firms wish to borrow an amount equal to its 
equity. The target variable was tapped by the question: “How would you rate the probability 
that you would support this firm’s credit request?” It was measured on a nine-point scale 
anchored in "Not at all Likely" (scored 1) and "Very Likely" (scored 9). 
Variation in the hypothetical SMEs consisted of eight attributes corresponding to the 
direct effect hypotheses; each attribute having two levels (e.g., high/low, see Table 2 for 
details on attributes and levels). An orthogonal fractional factorial design lead to 16 
hypothetical SMEs, allowing each main effect and selected two-way interactions to be 
investigated (Hahn and Shapiro, 1966). Each of the 16 profiles was replicated in order to 
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assess test-retest reliability. These 32 profiles were randomly assigned to avoid order effects. 
A pre-test conducted with lending officer and academics confirmed the validity of the 
attributes and levels.  
The subjects conducting the experiment consisted of 114 lending officers who decide 
on SME credit. They represent four of the five commercial banks active in Sweden and were 
recruited from the bank branches within a region known for its SMEs and entrepreneurial 
spirit. Data collection was conducted at the participants’ place of work. To alleviate potential 
concerns about bias a representative sample of bankers from the four banks evaluated the 
proposals, rural /urban, age, experience. These four banks represent 61,7 % of all Swedish 
bank offices and 69,7 % of all Swedish bank employees. One hundred and eight of the 
participating bank officers were employed among 55 bank branches within a 150-kilometer 
radius from Jönköping, Sweden, a region well known for its above average number of SMEs 
and entrepreneurial spirit. A pilot study with six bank managers, representing the same bank 
branch was conducted. The bank branch is located about 1,000 kilometres from Jönköping. 
We approached the district manager, division manager, or branch manager by telephone to 
explain the importance of the research form an academic and bank points of view. Four of the 
five largest commercial banks in Sweden supported the research. The regional and local or 
bank organizational level was chosen as a pool of lending officers with experience in 
assessing credit applications from SMEs. We focused on lending officers with relevant 
experience rather than a random sample.  
By conventional research standards the sample size seems limited. However smaller 
sample sizes are suitable for conjoint experiments and our sample size is lager than most 
conjoint or policy capturing studies.  
The sample represents a wide range of bank officers. 86 % were male, education background 
varied between nine-year compulsory education (7.9 %), Senior high school (41.2 %), some 
university education (28.9 %), bachelor’s degree (14.0 %), and master’s degree (7.9 %). Age 
ranged between 25 and 61 years (average 45.5 years) and bank employment ranged from 1 to 
42 years with experience in assessing credit request from one month to 36 years. The average 
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credit request ranged from 26 MSEK for micro companies to 102 MSEK for small 
companies, and 196 MSEK for medium-sized companies. The bank branch were the 
respondent was employed ranged in size from three to 100 employees, and employees in the 
credit department between one and 20. The approach enabled the situation to be as near as 
possible to actual lending conditions and by predetermining the lending attributes, the risk 
assessment was framed in a realistic and consent context. 
Analysis 
An individual-subject regression analysis was performed for each individual. The regression 
coefficients were then aggregated across all subjects and the corresponding individual t-
statistics were aggregated to a single Z score, as suggested in the literature (Dechow, Husson 
and Sloan, 1994).  
The Z scores for each factor and the selected two-way interactions, derived from the 
individual t-statistics, are reported in Table 3. The t-statistics for each individual bank 
manager is main factor and the selected two-way interactions are calculated by using a linear 
regression analysis. The results of this calculation are aggregated to the Z-values for each 
factor and the selected two-way interactions indicate bank officers’ significance to support the 
hypothetical credit request. The calculated Z-values show which main factors and selected 
two-way interactions are statistical significant, Z-values greater than 1.645 indicate a 
statistical significance at a 5 % level, a Z-value greater than 2.3 a significance at a 1 % level, 
and a Z-value greater than 3.0 a significance at a 0.1 % level. The sign of the calculated Z-
value indicates the direction of use of a certain factor. Hypotheses on the main factors are 
supported if the calculated Z-value is greater than 1.645 and the direction is as hypothesized. 
The size of the Z-values indicates the importance of the factor, i.e., the higher the Z-value, the 
more important the factor (Andersen, 1971). 
The calculations of the aggregated Z-values show that with the exception of strategic 
planning the main factors, are greater than 3.0, which indicates their significance at a 0.1 % 
level in lending officers’ assessments to support hypothetical credit requests. Risk-taking 
proclivity interaction with both financial standing and collateral are also statistically 
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significant (p < .001). However, risk-taking proclivity in combination with the share of 
investment by the SME did not show a statistically significant affect.  
The size of the Z-values indicates the level of significance of the factor, with past 
performance being most important, followed in order by financial standing, competence 
within the business project, independence of collateral, share of investment by the SME, the 
CEO’s tenure, and risk-taking proclivity. The least important are the interaction risk-taking 
proclivity in combination with financial standing and risk-taking proclivity in combination 
with collateral. 
Correlation analysis was used to test the test-retest consistency of responses for the 
sixteen replicated profiles. A Person R correlation was calculated between each of the bank 
manager’s responses on the 16 original cases and the 16 replicated lending profiles. To 
compare the means between the 16 original profiles and the 16 replications a paired sample t-
test indicated the respondent’s consistency in the credit assessment. These correlations range 
between 0.35 and 0.96, strongly supporting the reliability of the attributes included in the 
study.  
RESULTS 
Table 4 shows the means of the aggregated results for the sample of lending officers. 
Examining the significant coefficients for the variables pertaining to information asymmetry, 
we find that risk proclivity has a negative effect on probability of granting credit, supporting 
H1. Competence within the business project, CEO tenure, and past performance all have 
positive effects on the probability of granting credit, supporting H2, H3, and H5, respectively. 
No significant effects were found for the level of strategic planning, leaving H4 unsupported. 
Concerning risk bearing, the SME’s share of the investment, financial standing and collateral 
had positive effects on chances of receiving credit supporting H6, H7 and H8, respectively.  
It is also interesting to examine the magnitude of the significant aggregated 
standardized regression coefficients and their rank order. These results show that in order of 
magnitude, the most important factor for the lending officers decision to support a growing 
SMEs credit application was past performance (β = 0.43). Then follow financial standing (β = 
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0.41), competence within the business project (β = 0.31), the strength of collateral offered (β 
= 0.29), the SME’s share of investment (β = 0.28), CEO tenure (β = 0.13), and finally, risk 
proclivity (β =0.04).  
The two-way interaction effects are displayed at the bottom of Table 2. Two 
interactions are significant; financial standing and collateral both interact with risk-taking. No 
significant interaction is found between the SME’s share of the investment and risk-taking 
proclivity. Therefore, H9 is not supported. In order to establish the characteristics of the 
significant interactions, we plotted the effect of risk-taking on the probability of supporting 
credit for values of share of investment and collateral set at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean, as suggested by Cohen and Cohen (1983). Weak financial standing enhances 
the negative effect that risk-taking has on the probability of supporting credit, supporting 
H10. The negative effect of risk-taking increases at a faster rate for firms with strong 
collateral. Thus, H11 is not supported. 
 
DISCUSSION  
The findings of this paper provide insights into lending officers’ credit decision-making. In 
order of magnitude, the findings suggest that past performance, financial standing, 
competence within the business project, collateral, the borrower’s share of the investment, 
CEO tenure, and risk-taking proclivity all affect the likelihood of a bank supporting a SME’s 
credit request.  
Out of the four factors that have the strongest effect on the probability of supporting 
credit, three relate to tangible features, i.e. past performance, financial standing, and 
collateral, that reduce the risk of the bank and shift the risk-taking to the borrowing SME. The 
importance of financial standing and collateral indicates that factors that make opportunistic 
behaviour a non-issue, because the bank will receive its money back irrespectively of the 
outcome of the project, are valued by the lending officers. This suggests that banks indeed 
place strong emphasis on the tangible accounting figures SMEs present. For example, the two 
most important factors (financial standing and past performance) indicate that the firm has the 
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necessary funds to operate the company (Beaulieu, 1996). Further, financial information is 
easily accessible and because an external auditor audits them, they are likely to be highly 
valid and reliable.  
From the banks’ viewpoint this is a likely rational strategy. It appears that several 
other factors identified in the literature, and included in our study, are more difficult to 
measure accurately. Therefore, banks might be unwilling to base their decisions on factors 
that may be considered vague or difficult to measure. As stated in the literature, as outsiders 
lending officers have difficulties evaluating SME behaviour, intentions, and incentives 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is especially the case in privately held firms where less 
firm information is revealed. Because of asymmetric information, lending officers lack inside 
information about the firm and therefore have difficulties evaluating its capabilities and 
actions (Sinkey, 1992). For example, while the human capital of a small business manager 
likely influences his or her ability to manage the company, years of CEO tenure might be too 
weak a proxy to actually tap this ability because the quality of the experience is unknown.  
Alternatively, it may be that these factors in fact are of less importance to the 
outcome of the project and the chances of the borrowing SME fulfilling its credit obligations. 
For example, the human capital of the CEO might have relatively little impact on the success 
of an individual project because other factors such as customer demand come into play. 
Consequently, the firm’s competence within the business project is more important than the 
CEO’s individual experience. The success of the project does not necessarily lay in the CEO’s 
abilities (Scherr et al., 1993). 
Another interesting observation is that the three most important factors are all related 
to the past success of the company (i.e., past performance, financial standing, and competence 
within the business project). It would therefore appear that banks assume that the past is a 
relatively good predictor of the future. While this may be a relevant conjecture, it also signals 
conservatism. It appears more difficult for firms that lack a track record to receive funding 
and to receive funding for genuinely new projects. It also signals that new firms are more 
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difficult to assess and that the credit assessment for new established firms should be based on 
other than the conventional factors. 
The fact that the comprehensiveness of the business plan was the only insignificant 
direct effect variable is particularly interesting. The writing of business plans is widely 
endorsed by normative literature, by governmental support agencies, and universities (Hindle, 
1997; Kahrs, 1995; Maitland, 1998; Rich and Gumpert, 1985). If prevalence were an 
indicator, “common wisdom” would suggest that business plans are of crucial importance to 
the success of small firms (Kahrs, 1995; Rich and Gumpert 1985). For example, financial 
resource providers (Barclays Bank, 1991), and government support agencies (ALMI, 1998) 
produce business-planning handbooks. There is, of course, a cost associated with writing a 
comprehensive business plan. Based on our findings, there appears to be little use for SMEs 
that have been in business for a while to (re-)write comprehensive plans when applying for 
loans. In an SME with limited resources, business planning inevitable takes resources away 
from other activities; activities that may be more important when managing a SME 
organization. 
However, the study shows that relying on the eight main factors provides an 
incomplete understanding of lending officers evaluation. A greater understanding can be 
gained by considering selected two-way interactions. We found two significant interactions. 
As hypothesized, the probability of supporting credit decreases with high risk proclivity, but 
at a faster rate for firms with weak financial position. This suggests that a strong financial 
position can compensate, at least in part, for a high risk proclivity. SMEs with strong financial 
standing can use their extensive financial resources to repay the loan and interest regardless of 
the outcome of the individual project.  
We also found an interaction between risk-taking proclivity and the strength of the 
collateral, as hypothesized. However, the form of the interaction was different from what we 
anticipated. Borrowers with weak collateral were unlikely to receive a loan regardless of their 
risk-taking proclivity, whereas borrows with strong collateral were significantly more likely 
to receive a loan if their risk-taking was low. This finding suggests that strong collateral does 
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not offset the negative aspects of high risk proclivity. As suggested in some literature (e.g. 
Coult, 1992), banks avoid placing themselves in situations where they are likely to have to 
call on the security to repay the loan. Instead, collateral is a last resort of repayment. 
However, banks want to secure their lending safeguard against moral hazard and avoid 
situations to finance project with low probability of losses. If a situation should occur where 
banks have to call on securities, they consider strong collateral, such as bonds and shares, as 
more important than weak collateral, such as floating charge, or receivables. This study 
supports previous studies which highlight the importance of trading experience and past 
performance in risk assessment (Deakins and Hussain, 1994; Fletcher, 1995). Of particular 
interest is the lack of importance attributed to Swedish bankers on the CEO’s prior experience 
and capabilities which suggests that Swedish loan officers are, on the whole, more interested 
in project information, than management/CEO capabilities. Further research should be 
undertaken to investigate the impact of different CEO and management characteristic on 
banks’ risk assessment. 
This study also underpins Mason and Stark (2004), that SME managers need to be 
aware of the need to customize their funding proposal according to whether they are seeking 
bank loan, approaching venture capital funds or seeking finance from business angels. 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of this paper provide insights into bank lending officers’ credit decision-making 
concerning SMEs. Our findings suggest that banks place the strongest emphasis on the 
tangible accounting figures SMEs present, and factors that shift the risk from the bank to the 
borrower. Further, the general risk-taking proclivity of the borrower interacts with the 
financial position of the borrower and collateral that is provided. 
This study examines the factors that lending officers actually use when deciding on 
credit granting towards SMEs. Whether or not these factors actually reflect aspects that are 
relevant to the probability of a borrower repaying a loan is an open question. Therefore, banks 
would benefit from comparing these results to their data on credit defaults. This comparison 
could lead to valuable insights and provide the basis for altering guidelines for credit 
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decisions. At a more basic level, banks managers can use our results to make comparisons 
with their existing credit guidelines. Is the correspondence high? If not, should the guidelines 
change, or should the bank try to influence the behaviour of lending officers? In essence, by 
providing knowledge about current decision-making procedures our research could assist 
banks to improve their decision-making processes.. 
It appears that SMEs that perform well and are financially strong need not worry 
about receiving credit, at least not if the credit application does not exceed their current 
equity. For new ventures that lack a track record, and SMEs that have a weak track record, the 
situation is more problematic. It appears that developing a strong business plan for the project 
to finance is not the way forward for established companies investing in new ventures, even if 
they have no customer track record with the bank applying for credit. Rather, in the absence 
of a strong track record and strong financials, these firms would benefit from showing that 
they have the competence to perform the activities the application concerns. In addition, they 
need to provide strong collateral, such as private property. Thus, for the owner-managers of 
these firms, receiving a bank loan could mean taking a large personal risk. 
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Appendix  
Table 1: Characteristics of the firm affecting the probability of receiving funding 
  
Risk-taking 
proclivity 
Competence 
within the 
business 
project 
CEO tenure Strategic planning 
Past  
performance 
Share of 
investment 
Financial 
standing Collateral 
Altman, 1984               X   
Altman, 1983           X   X   
Anderson, 1999         X 
Andersson & 
Helander, 1993               X   
Ang, 1991, 1992 X     X         
Barton & 
Matthew, 1989   X    X  X         
Beaulieu, 1994      X       X  X 
Beaulieu, 1996     X  X  X X 
Becker, 1975       X           
Berger, 
1997/1998     X X X       X 
Berger & Udell, 
1995     X           X 
Berger & Udell, 
2003            X   X X 
Berggren, 
Lindström, & 
Olofsson, 2001   
 X     X X 
Besanko & 
Thankor, 1987     X           X 
Bester, 1985, 
1987     X           X 
Bhide, 1992         X         
Binks, Ennew, & 
Reed, 1992   X  X     X      X 
Boot, Thakor 
and Udell 1991   X           X 
Brealey & 
Myers, 1991           X   X   
Broomé, Elmér, 
& Nylén, 1998           X       
Bruce, 2001       X           
Brüderl & 
Schüssler, 1990  X X X X         
Büschgen, 1993         X   X X 
Bruns, 2002  X  X X  X X 
Bruns, 2005 X X X X X X X X 
Burtis, 1991                X   
Chan & 
Kanatas, 1985; 
Chan & Thakor, 
1987 
             X 
Cooper et al., 
1995     X           
Cooper et al., 
1989       X           
Cornet & 
Saunders, 1991   X         X   
Coult, 1992               X 
Cranfill, 
1989/1990  X    X  X    X   
Cressy et al. 
1997b         X X 
Davidson & 
Honig, 2003       X           
Deakins & 
Hussain, 1994       X  X  
Dixon, 1991     X             
Evans & 
Jovanovic, 1989 X   X      X    X 
Firth, 1979           X   X   
Fischer, Reuber, 
& Dyke, 1993     X X           
Fletcher, 1995  X X  X X  X 
George, 1991      X X  X      X   
Gibson, 1983     X     X   X X 
 34
  
Risk-taking 
proclivity 
Competence 
within the 
business 
project 
CEO tenure Strategic planning 
Past  
performance 
Share of 
investment 
Financial 
standing Collateral 
Glassman, 1987   X    X    X  X 
Gorman & 
Sahlman, 1986     X             
Gopinath, 1995      X   X X 
Green, 1998        X X       
Hamm, 1996     X  X   X 
Harhoff and 
Körting 1998   X             
Hedelin, 1999        X X         
Hedelin & 
Sjöberg, 1993; 
1995  
   X  X           
Leeth & Scott, 
1989                 X 
Levin & Travis, 
1987   X       X      X 
Libby, 1976         X  
Libby, 1979    X    X   X   X   
MacMillan, 
Seigel, & Subba 
Narasimha, 
1985   
    X           
Meyer, 1993       X  X X 
Miller, Reed, & 
Strawser, 1993           X   X   
Modigliani & 
Miller, 1958   X    X    
Montagno, 
Kuratko, & 
Scarcella, 1986  
X  X      
Myers & Majluf, 
1984             X     
Petersen & 
Rajan, 1994     X X       X   
Pettit & Singer, 
1985   X X X     X    X 
Reed & Gill, 
1989         X X   X X 
Robinsson, 
1987       X           
Rodgers, 1991   X     X X  
Ruth, 1987     X     X   X X 
Sargent & 
Young, 1991     X X X         
Scherr, Sugrue, 
& Ward, 1993    X X X           
Shapiro, 1990             X     
Shepherd & 
Shanley, 1998      X  X           
         
Shepherd, 1997; 
Shepherd & 
Douglas, 1999   
  X  X           
Sinkey, 1992       X X     X   
Smith, 1991                   
Sortino & van de 
Meer, 1991   X        
Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981    X        X X X 
Still, 1984     X   X   X X 
Storey, 1994b   X   X    X 
Storey, 1994a     X   X   
Storey & 
Cressy, 1996   X   X X       X 
Strischek, 1990      X           
Svensson, 2003         X   X   
Svensson Kling, 
1999       X X X   X   
Thorne, 1989                 X 
Tiermey & 
Truglio, 1997           X   X   
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Risk-taking 
proclivity 
Competence 
within the 
business 
project 
CEO tenure Strategic planning 
Past  
performance 
Share of 
investment 
Financial 
standing Collateral 
         
Timmofts, 1987     X           
Toivanen & 
Cressy, 2000                 X 
Tyebjee & 
Bruno, 1984       X        X   
Uzzi, 1999            X    X X 
Vaughn, 1997       X   X   X   
Walker, 1989        X X  
Wright, Robbie, 
& Ennew, 1997       X           
Zacharakis & 
Meyer, 1998    X X      
Zacharakis & 
Shepherd, 2004      X           
 
Note: References in full can be obtained from the authors 
 
 
Table 2: Attributes and Attribute Levels of the Conjoint Experiment 
 
Attribute   
Risk 
proclivity 
The firm prefers high-risk projects 
with chances of very high returns. 
The firm prefers low-risk projects 
that have high probability to gain a 
small profit. 
Competence 
within the 
business 
project  
The new project is estimated to be 
profitable, it is in line with previous 
projects conducted by the firm and the 
firm has documented knowledge 
within the field of activity. 
The new project is estimated to be 
profitable, but is considerably 
different from previous activities and 
the firm has limited knowledge 
within the new field of activity. 
CEO's tenure The CEO started his/her position 8 
years ago, has a business education, is 
regarded as honest, honourable and 
reliable. The CEO lacks previous work 
experience in the industry and in a 
management. 
The CEO started his/her position 2 
years ago, has a business education, 
is regarded as honest, honourable and 
reliable. The CEO lacks previous 
work experience in the industry and 
in a management. 
Strategic 
planning  
The company has a comprehensive 
business plan which is documented 
and followed. 
The company follows a distinct 
strategic line, but its plans for doing 
so are not documented. 
Past 
performance 
The company’s profitability is well 
above the industry average.  
The company’s profitability is lower 
than the industry average. 
SME’s share 
of investment 
The firm finances 35 % of the capital 
requirements either by internal 
generated funds or by additional 
capital of the owner(s). 
The firm finances 5 % of the capital 
requirements either by internal 
generated funds or by additional 
capital of the owner(s). 
Financial 
position 
The firm’s liquidity and solvency 
(share of equity in relation to total 
capital) is well above the industry 
average. 
The firm’s liquidity and solvency 
(share of equity in relation to total 
capital) is lower than the industry 
average. 
Collateral The firm offers collateral that is 
independent of the firm’s success or 
failure, e.g. bond and shares in other 
companies, guarantee commitment, 
private property, etc. 
The firm offers collateral that is 
dependent on the firm’s success or 
failure, e.g. floating charge, 
receivables, etc. 
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Table 3: Z-values, their ranks and unstandardized B for main factors and selected two-
way interactions.  
Variable Z-value  Rank B  
Risk-taking proclivity 3.96
****
* 7 
0.14 
Competence within the business 
project 36.45
****
* 3 
1.26 
CEO's tenure 
13.55
****
* 6 
0.50 
Strategic planning  1.09 10 0.03 
Past profitability 
51.58
****
* 1 
1.76 
Share of investment by SME 
32.39
****
* 5 
1.13 
Financial standing 
48.79
****
* 2 
1.68 
Collateral 
34.02
****
* 4 
1.19 
   
Risk × SME share 0.40 11 0.05 
Risk × Financial Standing 
-3.25
****
* 8 
-0.25 
Risk × Collateral 
3.14
****
* 9 
0.23 
Note: * = p < .05; **= p < .01; *** =  p < .001. 
Table 4: Aggregated Results of Lending Officers Probability of Supporting SME Credit 
Variable 
Aggregated mean of 
standardized regression 
coefficient Rank 
Risk-taking proclivity 0,04** 7 
Competence within the 
business project 0,31*** 3 
CEO's tenure 0,13*** 6 
Strategic planning  0,01    8 
Past profitability 0,43*** 1 
SME’s share of 
investment 0,28*** 5 
Financial position 0,41*** 2 
Collateral 0,29*** 4 
   
Aggregated mean of R2 0,87  
Note: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001  
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